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Abstract. This work presents a new code-based key encapsulation mech-
anism (KEM) called LEDAkem. It is built on the Niederreiter cryptosys-
tem and relies on quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check codes as secret
codes, providing high decoding speeds and compact keypairs. LEDAkem
uses ephemeral keys to foil known statistical attacks, and takes advan-
tage of a new decoding algorithm that provides faster decoding than the
classical bit-flipping decoder commonly adopted in this kind of systems.
The main attacks against LEDAkem are investigated, taking into account
quantum speedups. Some instances of LEDAkem are designed to achieve
different security levels against classical and quantum computers. Some
performance figures obtained through an efficient C99 implementation
of LEDAkem are provided.
Keywords: Code-based cryptography, key encapsulation mechanism,
Niederreiter cryptosystem, post-quantum cryptography, quasi-cyclic low-
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1 Introduction
Devising efficient and robust post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms
(KEMs) is an important and urgent research target, as also witnessed by the re-
cent NIST call for post-quantum cryptographic systems [32]. Code-based
cryptosystems are among the most promising candidates to replace quantum-
vulnerable primitives which are still relying on the hardness of the integer factor-
ization or discrete logarithm problems, such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
and the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and ElGamal cryptosystems. Indeed,
Shor’s algorithm [41] can be used to solve both the integer factorization and the
discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time with a quantum computer. One
of the problems for which no known polynomial time algorithm on a quantum
computer exists is the decoding of a general linear code. Indeed, such a prob-
lem belongs to the non deterministic-polynomial (NP)-complete computational
equivalence class [11, 27], which is widely believed to contain problems which
have no polynomial time solution on a quantum computer.
The first code-based public-key cryptosystem relying on the general linear
code decoding problem was proposed by McEliece in 1978 [28], and used Goppa
codes [18] to form the secret key. Such a choice yields large public keys, which is
the main limitation of Goppa code-based systems. The Niederreiter cryptosys-
tem [34] is a code-based cryptosystem exploiting the same trapdoor, but using
syndromes and parity-check matrices instead of codewords and generator ma-
trices as in McEliece. When the same family of codes is used, Niederreiter and
McEliece are equivalent [25] and therefore they achieve the same security levels.
Replacing Goppa codes with other families of more structured codes may re-
duce the public key size. However, this may also compromise the system security,
as it occurred with some first McEliece variants based on quasi-cyclic (QC) codes
[17], low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes [31] and quasi-cyclic low-density
parity-check (QC-LDPC) codes [35], quasi-dyadic (QD) codes [30], convolu-
tional codes [26] and some instances based on generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS)
codes [7, 10]. Nevertheless, some variants exploiting QC-LDPC and quasi-cyclic
moderate-density parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes [2, 3, 29] have been shown to
be able to achieve very compact keys without endangering security.
Recently, some new statistical attacks have been developed that exploit the
information coming from decryption failures in QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-
based systems to perform key recovery attacks, thus forcing to renew keys fre-
quently in these systems [16, 20].
In this paper, we start from the QC-LDPC code-based system proposed in [3,
2] and we develop a new KEM based on the the Niederreiter cryptosystem. We
also introduce an improved decoding algorithm which exploits correlation among
intentional errors seen by the private code. This way, the correction capability of
the private code is exploited to the utmost, thus allowing to achieve significant
reductions in the public key size. We call the new system LEDAkem and study
its properties and security. We take into account the fact that Grover’s algorithm
running on a quantum computer may be exploited to speedup attacks based on
information set decoding (ISD) [22, 43], and we propose some sets of parameters
for LEDAkem achieving different security levels against attacks exploiting both
classical and quantum computers. We also describe an optimized software im-
plementation of the proposed system and provide and discuss some performance
figures. LEDAkem currently is one of the first round candidate algorithms of
the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization project [32], along with
other code-based KEMs. In this work we will highlight the differences between
our proposal and the closest one among the others, i.e. BIKE [1], which relies
on QC-MDPC codes for its construction.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe LEDAkem.
In Section 3 we present its security analysis and in Section 4 its peculiar features.
In Section 5 we discuss some implementation issues and we show some numerical
results. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 The LEDAkem cryptosystem
The LEDAkem cryptosystem is derived from the Niederreiter cryptosystem with
the following main differences:
– Non-algebraic codes known as QC-LDPC codes are used as secret codes.
– The public code is neither coincident with nor equivalent to the private code.
– Suitably designed iterative non-bounded-distance decoding algorithms are
used.
The motivation for using QC-LDPC codes as private codes is in the fact that
these such codes are known to achieve important reductions in the public key
size when used in this context [2, 29]. Moreover, when LDPC codes are used as
private codes, the public code cannot be either coincident with or equivalent to
the private code. Indeed, in such a case, an attacker could search for low weight
codewords in the dual of the public code and find a sparse parity-check matrix
of the private code which allows efficient decoding.
For this reason, following [2], LEDAkem uses a transformation matrix Q that
hides the sparse parity-check matrix H of the private code into a denser parity-
check matrix L = HQ of the public code. This also affects the error vector that
must be corrected during decryption, which is obtained from the error vector
used during encryption through multiplication by Q. In this work, we show
how it is possible to exploit the knowledge of Q to design an ad-hoc decoding
algorithm achieving very good performance in terms of both decoding speed and
decryption failure rate (DFR).
In fact, a well-known feature of LDPC coding is that the decoding radius of
iterative decoders is not sharp and cannot be estimated in a deterministic way.
It follows that some residual DFR must be tolerated, and it must be estimated
heuristically through Montecarlo simulations. This is done for all the proposed
instances of LEDAkem in order to guarantee that they achieve a sufficiently low
DFR. Providing quantitative estimates of the DFR for the proposed instances
of LEDAkem allows us to prevent attacks such as the ones described in [16, 20]
changing the key either at each round of the KEM, or before a sufficient amount
of decoding failures are observed by the attacker.
2.1 Coding background
A QC code is defined as a linear block code with dimension k = pk0 and length
n = pn0, in which each cyclic shift of a codeword by n0 symbols results in another
valid codeword. It follows from their definition that QC codes have generator and
parity-check matrices in “blocks circulant” form or, equivalently, in “circulants
block” form. The latter is used in LEDAkem. A v × v circulant matrix A has
the following form
A =


a0 a1 a2 · · · av−1
av−1 a0 a1 · · · av−2
av−2 av−1 a0 · · · av−3
...
...
...
. . .
...
a1 a2 a3 · · · a0


. (1)
According to its definition, any circulant matrix is regular, since all its rows and
columns are cyclic shifts of the first row and column, respectively.
The set of v × v binary circulant matrices forms an algebraic ring under the
standard operations of modulo-2 matrix addition and multiplication. The zero
element is the all-zero matrix, and the identity element is the v × v identity
matrix. The algebra of the polynomial ring F2[x]/〈xv + 1〉 is isomorphic to the
ring of v × v circulant matrices over F2 with the following map
A↔ a (x) =
v−1∑
i=0
aix
i. (2)
According to (2), any binary circulant matrix is associated to a polynomial in
the variable x having coefficients over F2 which coincide with the entries of the
first row of the matrix
a (x) = a0 + a1x+ a2x
2 + a3x
3 + · · ·+ av−1xv−1. (3)
According to (2), the all-zero circulant matrix corresponds to the null polyno-
mial and the identity matrix to the unitary polynomial. The ring of polynomials
F2[x]/〈xv +1〉 includes elements that are zero divisors which are mapped to sin-
gular circulant matrices over F2. Avoiding such matrices is important in some
parts of LEDAkem, and smart ways exist to design non-singular circulant ma-
trices. As it will be described next, the main part of the secret key of LEDAkem
is formed by a binary QC-LDPC code described through its parity-check matrix
H . Let n denote the code length in bits and k denote the code dimension in bits,
then H has size (n− k)× n = r × n, where r is the code redundancy.
2.2 Description of the primitives
The main functions of LEDAkem are described next.
Key generation. Both private and public keys consist of binary matrices.
These matrices, in their turn, are formed by p × p circulant blocks, being p an
integer properly chosen.
Secret key. The key generation input is formed by:
– The circulant block size p (usually in the order of some thousands bits).
– The integer n0 (usually between 2 and 4), representing the number of circu-
lant blocks forming the matrix H .
– The integer dv, representing the row/column weight (usually between 15 and
25) of the circulant blocks forming the matrix H .
– The vector of integers m¯ = [m0,m1, . . . ,mn0−1], representing the row/column
weights (each entry usually smaller than 10) of the circulant blocks forming
the matrix Q (the structure of Q is clarified below).
Given these inputs, the secret key is obtained as follows.
First, n0 sparse circulant matrices with size p × p are generated at ran-
dom. Each of them has row/column weight dv. We denote such matrices as
H0, H1, . . . , Hn0−1. The secret low-density parity-check matrix H is then ob-
tained as
H = [H0|H1|H2| . . . |Hn0−1] . (4)
The size of H is p × n0p. Other n20 sparse circulant blocks Qi,j are then
randomly generated to form the secret sparse matrix
Q =


Q0,0 Q0,1 . . . Q0,n0−1
Q1,0 Q1,1 . . . Q1,n0−1
...
...
. . .
...
Qn0−1,0 Qn0−1,1 . . . Qn0−1,n0−1

 . (5)
The row/column weight of each block Qi,j is fixed according to the following
matrix:
w(Q) =


m0 m1 . . . mn0−1
mn0−1 m0 . . . mn0−2
...
...
. . .
...
m1 mn0−1 . . . m0

 , (6)
such that each row and each column of Q has weight m =
∑n0−1
i=0 mi.
The choice of the weights m¯ = [m0,m1, · · · ,mn0−1] and the size p of the
circulant blocks composing it is very important since it allows to discern if Q is
invertible or not. In particular, denoting with Π {·} the permanent of a matrix,
the following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. Let p > 2 be a prime such that ordp(2) = p−1 and Q be an n0×n0
matrix of elements in F2[x]/〈xp + 1〉; if Π {w(Q)} is odd and Π {w(Q)} < p,
then Q is non singular.
Proof. Omitted for the sake of brevity.
With this result, we can guarantee that, when the sequence m¯ is properly chosen,
the matrix Q is always non singular, which is a necessary condition for the key
generation process to be successful.
Definition 1. The secret key (SK) of LEDAkem is formed by {H,Q}.
Since both H and Q are formed by sparse circulant blocks, it is convenient
to represent each of these blocks through the indexes of the symbols 1 in their
first row, i.e. adopt a sparse representation for them. Each index of this type
requires ⌈log2(p)⌉ bits to be stored. If we consider that the circulant blocks in
any block row of Q have overall weight m =
∑n0−1
i=0 mi, the size of SK in bits is
Ssk = n0 (dv +m) ⌈log2(p)⌉ . (7)
In practice, the secret matrices are generated through a deterministic random
bit generator (DRBG), seeded with a bit string extracted from a true random
number generator (TRNG). In this case, to obtain H and Q it is sufficient to
know the TRNG extracted seed of the DRBG that has been used to generate
the positions of their non-null coefficients, since this process is rather fast. This
approach allows reducing the size of the secret key to the minimum required, as
it is assumed that the TRNG output cannot be compressed. The entity of the
reduction depends on the values of the parameters involved in (7).
Public key. Starting from H and Q, the following binary matrices are computed.
First of all, the matrix L is obtained as
L = HQ = [L0|L1|L2| . . . |Ln0−1] . (8)
If both dv and m are odd, then Ln0−1 has full-rank. In fact, Ln0−1 =∑n0−1
i=0 HiQi,n0−1 and has weight equal to mdv − 2c (where c is the number
of cancellations occurred in the product). It is possible to demonstrate that if
mdv is odd and mdv < p then Ln0−1 is non-singular.
After inverting Ln0 , the following matrix is computed:
M = L−1n0−1L = [M0|M1|M2| . . . |Mn0−2|I] = [Ml|I] . (9)
Definition 2. The public key (PK) of LEDAkem is formed by Ml = [M0|M1
|M2| . . . |Mn0−2].
Since the circulant blocks forming Ml are dense, it is convenient to store
them through the binary representation of their first row (the other rows are
then obtained as cyclic shifts of the first row). The bit-size of the PK hence is
Spk = (n0 − 1) p. (10)
Encryption. The plaintext of LEDAkem is an ephemeral random secret gen-
erated by Bob who is willing to share it with Alice. The encryption inputs are:
– The values of n0 and p, from which n = n0p is computed.
– The number of intentional errors t≪ n.
Bob generates a secret in the form of a random binary vector e with length of
n = n0p bits and Hamming weight t. Given a key derivation function (KDF), the
shared secret key ks is generated from e as ks = KDF(e). In order to encapsulate
the shared secret e, Bob fetches Alice’s PKMl and computes s = [Ml|I] eT where
T denotes matrix transposition. The p × 1 syndrome vector s representing the
encapsulated secret is then sent to Alice.
Decryption. In order to perform decryption, Alice must recover e from s.
The latter can be written as s = MeT = L−1n0−1Le
T = L−1n0−1HQe
T . The first
decryption step for Alice is computing s′ = Ln0−1s = HQe
T . For this purpose,
Alice needs to know Ln0−1 that, according to (8), is the last circulant block of
the matrix HQ. Hence, it can be easily computed from the SK which contains
both H and Q. If we define the expanded error vector as
e′ = eQT , (11)
then we have s′ = He′T . Hence, QC-LDPC decoding throughH can be exploited
for recovering e′ from s′. QC-LDPC decoders are not bounded distance decoders,
and some DFR must be tolerated. However, the system parameters can be chosen
such that the DFR is acceptably small. For this purpose, the average decoding
radius of the private code must be sufficiently larger than the Hamming weight
of e′, which is approximately equal to mt (due to the sparsity of Q and e). Then,
multiplication by
(
QT
)−1
would be needed to obtain e from e′, that is,
e = e′
(
QT
)−1
. (12)
However, by exploiting the efficient decoding algorithm described in Sec-
tion 2.3, this last step can be avoided, which also allows avoiding the computation
and storage of
(
QT
)−1
as part of the secret key. In fact, the decoding algorithm
described in Section 2.3 allows recovering e directly by performing decoding of
s′ = Ln0−1s = HQe
T through H , while taking into account the effect of the
multiplication of e by Q. Then, the secret key is recovered as ks = KDF(e).
In case a decoding error occurs, the decryption procedure derives the shared
secret combining with a KDF the syndrome with a secret constant, which may
be derived via a PRNG from the secret key material [38]. Alternatively, using a
secret permutation of the syndrome as input to the KDF was noted to be effective
in [21]. Such an approach which is beneficial from the security standpoint in
case of an accidental keypair reuse. More details concerning this aspect, which is
related to formal security of LEDAkem, will be given in Section 4. According to
this approach, Bob will become aware of the decoding failure upon reception of
the message sent by Alice encrypted with the incorrectly derived shared secret.
2.3 Efficient decoding
Classical bit flipping (BF) decoding works as follows. At each iteration, for each
codeword bit position, the number of unsatisfied parity-check equations is com-
puted, and if this number equals or exceeds a given threshold, then that bit is
flipped. The decision threshold can be chosen in many ways, affecting the de-
coder performance, and it can be fixed or it can vary during iterations. A choice
that often turns out to be optimal is to fix the threshold, at each iteration, as the
maximum number of unsatisfied parity-check equations in which any codeword
bit is involved. In fact, a codeword bit participating in a higher number of un-
satisfied parity-check equations can be considered less reliable than a codeword
bit participating in a smaller number of unsatisfied parity-check equations. So,
if the threshold is chosen in this way, the bits that are flipped are those that are
most likely affected by errors.
Starting from classical BF, we have developed an improved decoder that
is specifically designed for LEDAkem, where the position of the ones in the
expanded error vector e′ to be corrected is influenced by the value of QT , as e′
is equivalent to a random error vector e with weight t multiplied by QT . Since
this improved decoder takes into account such a multiplication by the transpose
of matrix Q to estimate with greater efficiency the locations of the bits of the
expanded error vector, we denote it as Q-decoder.
Inputs of the decoder are the syndrome s′ and the matrices H and Q ac-
cording to (4) and (5), respectively. The output of the decoder is a 1× n vector
eˆ or a decoding failure, where eˆ represents the decoder estimate of the error
vector e appearing in the equality s′ = HQeT . The decoding process performs a
maximum of lmax iterations, where the l-th iteration processes s
(l−1) and eˆ(l−1)
(that is the values at the previous iteration) and outputs s(l) and eˆ(l). A thresh-
old criterion is adopted to compute the positions in eˆ(l) that must be changed.
The threshold values b(l) can be chosen in different ways and affect the decoder
performance. In the next section we describe a simple and effective procedure to
design such values. The decoder initialization is performed by setting s(0) = s′T
and eˆ(0) = 0n, where 0n is the length-n vector with all-zero entries. It is im-
portant to note that s(0) (and, by extension, s(l)) is a row vector. Moreover,
let us consider that all multiplications are binary, expect those denoted with ‘∗’,
which are performed in the integer domain Z. The l-th iteration of the Q-decoder
performs the following operations:
i. Compute Σ(l) =
[
σ
(l)
1 , σ
(l)
2 , · · · , σ(l)n
]
= s(l−1) ∗ H , resulting in a vector of
integers having entries between 0 and dv.
ii. Compute R(l) =
[
ρ
(l)
1 , ρ
(l)
2 , · · · , ρ(l)n
]
= Σ(l) ∗Q.
iii. Define ℑ(l) =
{
v ∈ [1, n]| ρ(l)v ≥ b(l)
}
.
iv. Update eˆ(l−1) as
eˆ(l) = eˆ(l−1) + 1ℑ(l)
where 1ℑ(l) is a length-n binary vector with all-zero entries, except those
indexed by ℑ(l).
v. Update the syndrome as
s(l) = s(l−1) +
∑
v∈ℑ(l) qvH
T
where qv is the v-th row of Q
T .
vi. If the weight of s(l) is zero then stop decoding and return eˆ(l).
vii. If l < lmax then increment l and go back to step i), otherwise stop decoding
and return a decoding failure.
As in classical BF, the first step of this algorithm computes the vector Σ(l).
Each entry of this vector counts the number of unsatisfied parity-check equations
corresponding to that bit position, and takes values in {0, . . . , dv}. This evaluates
the likelihood that the binary element of e′ at the same position is equal to
one. Differently from classical BF, in step ii) the correlation R(l) between these
likelihoods and the rows of QT is computed. In fact, the expanded error vector
e′ = eQT can be written as the sum of the rows of QT indexed by the support
of e, that is e′ =
∑
j∈Ψ{e} qj where Ψ {e} denotes the support of e.
Since both Q and e are sparse (that is, m, t≪ n), cancellations between ones
in the sum are very unlikely. When the correlation between Σ(l) and a generic
row qv of Q
T is computed, two cases may occur:
– If v /∈ Ψ {e}, then it is very likely that qv has a very small number of common
ones with all the rows of QT forming e′, hence the correlation is small.
– If v ∈ Ψ {e}, then qv is one of the rows of QT forming e′, hence the correlation
is large.
The main difference with classical BF is that, while in the latter all error
positions are considered as independent, the Q-decoder exploits the correlation
among expanded errors which is present in LEDAkem, since their positions are
influenced by QT . This allows achieving important reductions in the number of
decoding iterations. As a further advantage, this decoder allows recovering e,
besides e′, without the need of computing and storing the inverse of the matrix
QT . For this purpose, it is sufficient that, at each iteration, the Q-decoder flips
the bits of the estimated error vector e that correspond to the correlations values
overcoming the threshold.
2.4 Choice of the Q-decoder decision thresholds
One important aspect affecting performance of the Q-decoder is the choice of
the threshold values against which the correlation is compared at each iteration.
A natural choice is to set the threshold used at iteration l equal to the maximum
value of the correlation R(l) , that is b(l) = maxj=1,2,··· ,n
{
ρ
(l)
j
}
. This strategy
ensures that only those few bits that have maximum likelihood of being affected
by errors are flipped during each iteration, thus achieving the lowest DFR. How-
ever, such an approach has some drawbacks in terms of complexity, since the
computation of the maximum correlation requires additional computations with
respect to a fixed threshold.
Therefore, as in [14], we consider a different strategy, which allows comput-
ing the threshold values on the basis of the syndrome weight at each iteration.
According to this approach, during an iteration it is sufficient to compute the
syndrome weight and read the corresponding threshold value from a look-up ta-
ble. This strategy still allows to achieve a sufficiently low DFR, while employing
a significantly smaller number of decoding iterations.
Let us consider the l-th iteration of the Q-decoder, and denote by tl the weight
of the error vector e(l) and with t′l the weight of the corresponding expanded error
vector e′(l) = e(l)QT . Let us introduce the following probabilities [6]:
pci(t
′
l) =
min[n0dv−1,t′l]∑
j = 0, j odd
(
n0dv−1
j
)(
n−n0dv
t′
l
−j
)
(
n−1
t′
l
)
pic(t
′
l) =
min[n0dv−1,t′l−1]∑
j = 0, j even
(
n0dv−1
j
)(
n−n0dv
t′
l
−j−1
)
(
n−1
t′
l
−1
) (13)
where pci(t
′
l) is the probability that a codeword bit is error-free and a parity-
check equation evaluates it to be incorrect, and pic(t
′
l) is the probability that
a codeword bit is error-affected and a parity-check equation evaluates it to be
correct. In both these cases, the syndrome bit is equal to 1. The probability that
each syndrome bit is equal to 1 can be therefore computed as pic(t
′
l)+ pci(t
′
l), so
the average syndrome weight at iteration l results in
w(l)s = E
[
wt
{
s(l)
}]
= [pic(t
′
l) + pci(t
′
l)] p (14)
where wt {·} denotes the Hamming weight. Since both the parity-check matrix
and the error vector are sparse, the probability of wt
{
s(l)
}
being significantly
different from w
(l)
s is negligible.
So, (14) allows predicting the average syndrome weight starting from t′l. In
order to predict how t′l varies during iterations, let us consider the i-th code-
word bit and the corresponding correlation value ρ
(l)
i at the l-th iteration. The
probability that such a codeword bit is affected by an error can be written as
P
{
ei = 1|ρ(l)i
}
=
P
{
ei = 1, ρ
(l)
i
}
P
{
ρ
(l)
i
} =

1 + P
{
ei = 0, ρ
(l)
i
}
P
{
ei = 1, ρ
(l)
i
}


−1
(15)
where ei is the i-th bit of the error vector used during encryption. After some
calculations, we obtain
P
{
ei = 1|ρ(l)i
}
=
1
1 + n−tl
tl
(
pci(tl)
pic(tl)
)ρ(l)
i
(
1−pci(tl)
1−pic(tl)
)mdv−ρ(l)i (16)
where pci(tl) and pic(tl) are given in (13), with tl as argument instead of t
′
l.
Adding the i-th row of QT to the expanded error vector e′ is the same as
flipping the i-th bit of the error vector e. Hence, we can focus on e and on how its
weight tl changes during decoding iterations. The values of t
′
l can be estimated
using (14), while, due to sparsity, those of tl can be estimated as t
′
l/m.
The decision to flip the i-th codeword bit is taken when the following condi-
tion is fulfilled
P
{
ei = 1|ρ(l)i
}
> (1 +∆)P
{
ei = 0|ρ(l)i
}
(17)
where ∆ ≥ 0 represents a margin that must be chosen taking into account
the DFR and complexity: increasing ∆ decreases the DFR but increases the
number of decoding iterations. So, a trade-off value of∆ can be found that allows
achieving a low DFR while avoiding unnecessary large numbers of iterations.
Since P
{
ei = 0|ρ(l)i
}
= 1− P
{
ei = 1|ρ(l)i
}
, (17) can be rewritten as
P
{
ei = 1|ρ(l)i
}
>
1 +∆
2 +∆
. (18)
P
{
ei = 1|ρ(l)i
}
is an increasing function of ρ
(l)
i , hence the minimum value of ρ
(l)
i
such that (18) is satisfied can be computed as
b(l) = min
{
ρ
(l)
i ∈ [0,mdv], s.t. P
{
ei = 1|ρ(l)i
}
>
1 +∆
2 +∆
}
(19)
and used as the decision threshold at iteration l.
Based on the above considerations, the procedure to compute the decision
threshold value per each iteration as a function of the syndrome weight can be
summarized as follows:
i. The syndrome weights corresponding to t′l = 0,m, 2m, · · · ,mt (which are all
the possible values of t′l neglecting cancellations) are computed according to
(14). These values are denoted as {ws(0), ws(m), · · · , ws(mt)}.
ii. At iteration l, given the syndrome weight w¯s
(l), the integer j ∈ [0, t] such
that ws(jm) is as close as possible to w¯s
(l) is computed.
iii. Consider tl = j and compute b
(l) according to (19) and (16). The value of
b(l), so obtained, is used as the decoding threshold for iteration l.
The above procedure can be implemented efficiently by populating a look-
up table with the pairs {wj , bj}, sequentially ordered. During an iteration, it is
enough to compute w¯s
(l), search the largest wj in the look-up table such that
wj < w¯s
(l) and set b(l) = bj.
We have observed that, moving from large to smalle values of wj , the thresh-
olds computed this way firstly exhibit a decreasing trend, then start to increase.
According to numerical simulations, neglecting the final increase is beneficial
from the performance standpoint. Therefore, in the look-up table we replace the
threshold values after the minimum with a constant value equal to the minimum
itself.
2.5 Relations with QC-MDPC code-based systems
In LEDAkem, the public code is a QC-MDPC code that admits L = HQ as
a valid parity-check matrix. However, differently from QC-MDPC code-based
schemes, the private code is a QC-LDPC code, which facilitates decoding. In
fact, decoding directly the public QC-MDPC code through classical BF decoders
would be a possibility, but the approach we follow is different. By using the
decoding algorithm described in Section 2.3, we decode the private QC-LDPC
code, taking into account the correlation introduced in the private error vector
due to multiplication by QT . Since the private QC-LDPC matrix is sparser than
the QC-MDPC matrix of the public code, this yields lower decoding complexity.
Besides working over different matrices, the main difference between these
two decoding algorithms is in the use of integer multiplications in our decoder,
while all multiplications are performed over F2 in classical BF decoders. In fact,
in our decoder we perform the following operation to compute R(l)
R(l) = s(l−1) ∗H ∗Q = eQTHT ∗H ∗Q ≈ eLT ∗ L (20)
where the last approximation comes from the fact that, for two sparse matrices
A and B, we have A ·B ≈ A ∗B. Thus, we can say that HQ ≈ H ∗Q. So, if we
consider classical BF decoding working over the matrix L = HQ, the counter
vector is computed as
Σ(l) = s(l−1) ∗ L = eLT ∗ L. (21)
In the Q-decoder, the error vector is updated by summing rows of QT , which
is equivalent to flipping bits of the public error vector. Hence, there is a clear
analogy between decoding of the private QC-LDPC code through the Q-decoder
and decoding of the public QC-MDPC code through a classical BF decoder.
Through numerical simulations we have verified that the two approaches yield
comparable performance in the waterfall region. Performance in the error floor
region is instead dominated by the minimum distance of the code over which
decoding is performed. Since QC-LDPC codes have smaller minimum distance
than QC-MDPC codes, this reflects into a higher error floor when decoding is
performed over the private QC-LDPC code. However, no error floor has been
observed during simulations of LEDAkem with QC-LDPC decoding, down to a
DFR between 10−9 and 10−8. Since this is the working point of the codes we use,
in terms of DFR, we can say that the error floor effect, if present, is negligible
from our scheme performance standpoint.
3 Security analysis
LEDAkem is constructed starting from the computational problem of syndrome
decoding, i.e., obtaining a bounded weight error vector from a given syndrome
and a general linear code, which was shown to be NP-complete in [11]. The main
difference from the statement of the general hard problem on which our proposal
is built is the nature of the code employed, which is quasi-cyclic and admits a
representation with a low-density parity-check matrix. To best of our knowledge,
there is no superpolynomial advantage in performing syndrome decoding on QC-
LDPC, given our public code representation, either due to the quasi-cyclic form
of the code or to the low density of its parity matrix. We point out that the same
assumption on the lack of advantage due to the quasi-cyclic structure of a code
has also been done in both the BIKE [1] and the BIG QUAKE [8] proposals.
With these statements standing, the security analysis of LEDAkem examines
and quantifies the effectiveness of the best known attacks detailing the efficiency
of algorithms running on both classical and quantum computers providing non-
exponential speedups over an enumerative search for the correct error vector.
We remark that currently no algorithm running on either a classical Turing
Machine (TM) or a quantum TM provides an exponential speedup in solving
the computational problem underlying LEDAkem compared to an exhaustive
search approach.
3.1 Analysis of the algorithm with respect to known attacks
As mentioned in the previous sections, LEDAkem derives from QC-LDPC code-
based cryptosystems already established in the literature [6, 4]. As proved in [16],
in case of using long-term keys, these cryptosystems may be subject to reaction
attacks that are able to recover the secret key by exploiting the inherent non-
zero DFR they exhibit and Bob’s reactions upon decryption failures. However,
using ephemeral keys prevents the possibility to mount an attack of this kind,
which requires long statistical evaluations. Nevertheless, the risks in case of an
accidental keypair reuse must be considered, and this will be done in Section 4.
A first type of attacks that can be mounted against LEDAkem are decoding
attacks (DAs) aimed at performing decoding through the public code repre-
sentation, without knowing the private code representation. The most powerful
algorithms that can be used for this purpose are ISD algorithms. These algo-
rithms aim at performing decoding of any linear block code by exploiting a
general representation of it. ISD algorithms have been introduced by Prange
[37] and subsequently improved by Lee-Brickell [23], Leon [24] and Stern [42].
More recently, they have known great advances through modern approaches,
also exploiting the generalized birthday paradox [27, 36, 12, 9, 33]. It is possible
to show that the general decoding problem is equivalent to the problem of find-
ing low-weight codewords in a general (random-like) code. Therefore, algorithms
for searching low-weight codewords can be used as ISD algorithms.
The availability of an efficient algorithm to search for low-weight codewords
is also at the basis of key recovery attacks (KRAs). In LEDAkem the matrix
L = HQ is a valid parity-check matrix for the public code. Since L is sparse,
by knowing it an attacker could separate H from Q and recover the secret key.
In order to discover L, an attacker must search for its rows in the dual of the
public code. Due to the sparsity of H and Q, any of these rows has weight in the
order of n0dvm. The attack can be implemented by exploiting again an efficient
algorithm for the search of low-weight codewords in linear block codes.
Another potential attack to systems based on QC-LDPC codes is that pre-
sented in [40]. This attack uses a special squaring technique and, by extracting
the low-weight error vectors, finds low-weight codewords more efficiently than
with a general ISD algorithm. This attack, however, is applicable if and only if
p is even. Therefore, in order to increase the system security it is advisable to
choose odd values of p. Choosing p as a prime is an even more conservative choice
against cryptanalysis exploiting factorization of p. The value of p in LEDAkem
is chosen in such a way to prevent these attacks.
To estimate complexity of DAs and KRAs exploiting ISD and low-weight
codeword searching algorithms, let us define the work factor (WF) of an algo-
rithm as the base-2 logarithm of the average number of binary operations it
requires to complete its execution successfully. Let WF (n, k, w) denote the WF
of the most efficient algorithm searching for codewords of weight w in a code
having length n and dimension k. Such an algorithm can be used to perform ISD
with the aim of decrypting a LEDAkem ciphertext without knowing the private
key. In this case, we have n = n0p, k = (n0 − 1)p and w = t. Moreover, due to
the QC nature of the codes, a speedup in the order of
√
p must be taken into
account [39]. Hence, the security level against decoding attacks of this type can
be computed as
SLDA =
WF (n0p, (n0 − 1)p, t)√
p
. (22)
Concerning the KRAs attack, based on the above considerations we have a
similar formula, but with different parameters, that is,
SLKRA =
WF (n0p, p, n0dvm)
p
, (23)
where the speedup factor p is due to the fact that recovering only one out of p
sparse rows of L, is enough for the attacker (due to the QC structure of L).
According to [43], the most efficient ISD algorithm taking into account Grover’s
algorithm [19] running on a quantum computer is Stern’s algorithm. Therefore,
the post-quantum security levels have been estimated by considering the work
factor of Stern’s algorithm with quantum speedup according to [43]. Instead,
with classical computers the most efficient ISD algorithm turns out to be the
BJMM algorithm in [9]. Therefore, the security levels against attackers provided
with classical computers have been estimated by considering the work factor
of BJMM in (22) and (23). We chose to employ the results provided in [43] to
evaluate the computational efforts of Stern’s variant of the ISD as they provide
exact formulas instead of asymptotic bounds. However, we note that a recent
work [22] provides improved asymptotic bounds on the computational complex-
ity of quantum ISD for increasing values of the codeword length n. Deriving
from this approach exact values for given parameters set is worth investigating.
3.2 System parameters
The NIST call for Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization [32] defines
5 security categories, numbered from 1 to 5 and characterized by increasing
strength (see [32] for details). According to this classification, nine instances
of LEDAkem are proposed, grouped in three classes corresponding to different
security levels. The three instances in each class correspond to three values of n0
(2, 3, 4), each one yielding a different balance between performance and public
key size. The parameters of the nine instances of LEDAkem are reported in
Table 1 for the security categories 1, 3 and 5, respectively. In the table, the
superscript (pq) denotes that the attack work factor has been computed taking
into account quantum speedups due to Grover’s algorithm, while the superscript
(cl) denotes that only classical computers have been considered.
For each security category and considered value of n0, we have fixed a value
of the parity-check matrix row/column weight dv in the order of 25 or less (that
is advisable to have good error correcting capability of the private QC-LDPC
codes), and we have found the values of p andm that allow satisfying (23) for the
target security level. In fact, the value of m must be chosen such that the dual
of the public code, having minimum distance equal to n0mdv, is robust against
KRAs based on ISD. Once n0 is fixed, we can find many pairs of valuesm and dv
which satisfy this bound; among these, we have chosen the one having the lowest
product mdv, which is a metric affecting the error correcting capability of the
private code. Then, we have found the value of t that allows satisfying (22) and
checked whether t′ = tm errors can be corrected by the private code through
Q-decoding with a sufficiently low DFR. Otherwise, we have increased the value
of p keeping all the other parameters fixed. Concerning the estimation of the
DFR, we have first exploited BF asymptotic thresholds [6], and then we have
performed Montecarlo simulations for each system instance in order to evaluate
its DFR. In all Montecarlo simulations, except the one for the Category 1, n0 = 2
parameter set, we have encountered no errors, so the DFR can be approximately
bounded by the reciprocal of the number of simulated decryptions. Concerning
Table 1. Parameters for LEDAkem and estimated computational efforts to break a
given instance as a function of the security category and number of circulant blocks n0
Category n0 p dv [m0, · · · ,mn0−1] t SL
(pq)
DA SL
(pq)
KRA SL
(cl)
DA SL
(cl)
KRA DFR
1
2 27, 779 17 [4, 3] 224 135.43 134.84 217.45 223.66 ≈8.3·10−9
3 18, 701 19 [3, 2, 2] 141 135.63 133.06 216.42 219.84 . 10−9
4 17, 027 21 [4, 1, 1, 1] 112 136.11 139.29 216.86 230.61 . 10−9
2–3
2 57, 557 17 [6, 5] 349 200.47 204.84 341.52 358.16 . 10−8
3 41, 507 19 [3, 4, 4] 220 200.44 200.95 341.61 351.57 . 10−8
4 35, 027 17 [4, 3, 3, 3] 175 200.41 201.40 343.36 351.96 . 10−8
4–5
2 99, 053 19 [7, 6] 474 265.38 267.00 467.24 478.67 . 10−8
3 72, 019 19 [7, 4, 4] 301 265.70 270.18 471.67 484.48 . 10−8
4 60, 509 23 [4, 3, 3, 3] 239 265.48 268.03 473.38 480.73 . 10−8
the parameter set for Category 1, n0 = 2, we obtained 20 failures on 2.394 · 109
decoding computations, pointing to a DFR ≈ 8.3 · 10−9.
In order to make a conservative design of the system, we have considered some
margin in the complexity estimates of the attacks, such that the actual security
level for these instances is larger than the target one. This also accounts for
possible (though rare) cancellations occurring in L, which may yield a row weight
slightly smaller than mdvn0. The values of dv have been chosen greater than 15
in order to avoid codes having too small minimum distances. In addition, they
are odd to ensure that the circulant blocks forming H and L (and Ln0−1, in
particular) have full rank. Also the values of m are always odd, and the sets
[m0,m1, · · · ,mn0−1] have been chosen in such a way to guarantee that Q has
full rank. In fact, L = HQ is a valid parity-check matrix for the public code: if
Q is singular, it might happen that the rank of L is lower than p, leading to a
code with a co-dimension lower than p. With the choice of an invertible Q, we
guarantee that this does not occur.
4 Properties of the proposed cryptosystem
The QC-LDPC code-based Niederreiter cryptosystem alone achieves only indis-
tinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA), that however is suffi-
cient in case of using ephemeral keys. It is possible to convert a Niederreiter cryp-
tosystem achieving only IND-CPA into one achieving indistinguishability under
chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA), under the assumption that the DFR of the
underlying code is zero. Such a conversion involves substituting the outcome of
a decoding failure (due to an ill-formed ciphertext) with the outcome of a KDF
taking as input either the public syndrome and a fixed secret bit sequence [21,
38], or a secret permutation of the syndrome itself [13]. We apply the conversion
specified in [21] to our scheme, despite its DFR is not null, as it still proves
beneficial in case of an accidental keypair reuse, against an attacker matching
the IND-CCA model whenever no decoding failures due to the QC-LDPC code
structure takes place. Furthermore, we note that LEDAkem ciphertexts are not
malleable in a chosen plaintext scenario. Indeed, even if an attacker alters arbi-
trarily a ciphertext so that it decrypts to a valid error vector e (e.g., discarding
the ciphertext and forging a new one), the shared secret is derived via a hash
based KDF, which prevents him from controlling the output of the decryption.
Relations with the security of QC-MDPC code-based systems. Differ-
ently from QC-MDPC code-based systems, the public code in LEDAkem has
a QC-MDPC matrix L that can be factorized into H and Q, and this might
appear to yielding lower security than a general QC-MDPC matrix. However, in
order to attempt factorization of L, the attacker should first recover it by search-
ing for low-weight codewords in the dual of the public code. Once L has been
recovered, trying to factorize it into H and Q indeed becomes pointless, since
the attacker could exploit L to perform direct decoding of the public QC-MDPC
code. Alternatively, an attacker could try to perform decoding of the public code,
which requires solving the syndrome decoding problem for the same code. The
best known techniques for solving these two problems are based on ISD, and no
method is known to facilitate their solution by exploiting the fact that L can be
factorized into H and Q.
Risks in case of keypair reuse. While LEDAkem uses ephemeral keys that are
meant for single use, it is possible that implementation accidents lead to a reuse
of the same keypair more than once. The main threat in case of keypair reuse
is the reaction attack described in [16], where a correlation between the DFR
and the private key is derived. However, for the attack to succeed, the attacker
needs to reliably estimate the decoding failure rate for a set of carefully crafted
or selected error vectors. Given the DFR for which LEDAkem was designed
(< 10−8), obtaining a reliable estimate requires a number of decryptions with
the same key in the order of billions. Since the said evaluation should be obtained
for all the possible distances between two set bits in the secret key, a conservative
estimate of the number of decryption actions required is (p − 1) 1
DFR
, which,
considering the weakest case, corresponding to Category 1 with n0 = 2, yields
& 2.7×1012 decryptions. Therefore, the attack presented in [16] is not a practical
threat on LEDAkem with the proposed parameters, unless a significant amount
of decryptions are performed with the same key. Moreover, even the chosen
ciphertext attack (CCA) described in [13], where a ciphertext is crafted with a
number of errors greater than t to artificially increase the DFR of the system,
can be thwarted through checking the weight of the decoded error vector and
reporting a decoding failure if it exceeds t.
Protection against side-channel attacks. The two most common side chan-
nels exploited to breach practical implementations of cryptosystems are the ex-
ecution time of the primitive and the instantaneous power consumption during
its computation. In particular, in [15], it was shown how a QC-LDPC code-
based system can be broken by means of simple power analysis, exploiting the
Table 2. Running times for key generation, encryption and decryption as a function
of the category and the number of circulant blocks n0 on an AMD Ryzen 5 1600 CPU.
Category n0
KeyGen Encrypt Decrypt Total CPU time
(ms) (ms) (ms) Ephemeral KEM (ms)
1
2 34.11 (±1.07) 2.11 (±0.08) 16.78 (±0.53) 52.99
3 16.02 (±0.26) 2.15 (±0.17) 21.65 (±1.71) 39.81
4 13.41 (±0.23) 2.42 (±0.08) 24.31 (±0.86) 40.14
2–3
2 142.71 (±1.52) 8.11 (±0.21) 48.23 (±2.93) 199.05
3 76.74 (±0.78) 8.79 (±0.20) 49.15 (±2.20) 134.68
4 54.93 (±0.84) 9.46 (±0.28) 46.16 (±2.03) 110.55
4–5
2 427.38 (±5.15) 23.00 (±0.33) 91.78 (±5.38) 542.16
3 227.71 (±1.71) 24.85 (±0.37) 92.42 (±4.50) 344.99
4 162.34 (±2.39) 26.30 (±0.53) 127.16 (±4.42) 315.80
control-flow dependent differences of the decoding algorithm. We note that em-
ploying ephemeral keys provides a natural resistance against non-profiled power
consumption side channel attacks, as a significant amount of measurements with
the same key (> 30) must be collected before the key is revealed.
Concerning execution time side channel information leakage, the main por-
tion of the LEDAkem decryption algorithm which is not characterized by a
constant execution time is decoding. Indeed, the number of iterations made by
the decoder depends on the values being processed. However, for the proposed
parameters, we note that the number of iterations is between 3 and 5, with a sig-
nificant bias towards 4. Hence, it is simple to achieve a constant time decoding by
modifying the algorithm so that it always runs for the maximum needed amount
of iterations to achieve the desired DFR. Such a choice completely eliminates
the timing leakage, albeit trading it off for a performance penalty.
5 Implementation and numerical results
An effort has been made to realize a fast and efficient C99 implementation of
LEDAkem without platform-dependent optimizations, which is publicly avail-
able in [5]. To this end, we represented each circulant block as a polynomial
in F2[x]/〈xp + 1〉 thanks to the isomorphism described in Section 2.1. Conse-
quently, all the involved block circulant matrices are represented as matrices of
polynomials in F2[x]/〈xp + 1〉. The polynomials are materialized employing a
bit-packed form of their binary coefficients in all the cases where the number of
non null coefficients is high. In case a polynomial has a low number of non null
coefficients with respect to the maximum possible, i.e., the circulant matrix is
sparse, we materialize only the positions of its one coefficients as integers.
We provide below the results of a set of execution time benchmarks. The re-
sults were obtained measuring the required time for key generation, encryption
(key encapsulation) and decryption (key decapsulation) as a function of the cho-
Table 3. Sizes of the keypair and encapsulated shared secret as a function of the chosen
category and number of circulant blocks n0.
Category n0
Private Key Size (B) Public Key Shared secret Enc secret
At rest In memory size (B) size (B) size (B)
1
2 24 668 3, 480 3, 480 32
3 24 844 4, 688 2, 344 32
4 24 1, 036 6, 408 2, 136 32
2–3
2 32 972 7, 200 7, 200 48
3 32 1, 196 10, 384 5, 192 48
4 32 1, 364 13, 152 4, 384 48
4–5
2 40 1, 244 12, 384 12, 384 64
3 40 1, 548 18, 016 9, 008 64
4 40 1, 772 22, 704 7, 568 64
sen security category and the number of circulant blocks n0. The measurements
reported are obtained as the average of 100 executions of the reference imple-
mentation. The generated binaries were run on an AMD Ryzen 5 1600 CPU at
3.2 GHz, locking the frequency scaling to the top frequency.
Table 2 reports the running times in terms of CPU time taken by the process.
As it can be noticed, the most computationally demanding primitive is the key
generation, which has more than 80% of its computation time taken by the exe-
cution of a single modular inverse in F2[x]/〈xp +1〉 required to obtain the value
of L−1n0−1. The encryption primitive is the fastest among all, and its computation
time is substantially entirely devoted (> 99%) to the n0 − 1 polynomial multi-
plications performing the encryption. The decryption primitive computation is
dominated by the Q-decoder computation (> 95% of the time), with a minimal
portion taken by the n0 modular multiplications which reconstruct Ln0−1 and
the one to compute the private syndrome fed into the Q-decoder.
Considering the computational cost of performing a KEM with ephemeral
keys, the most advantageous choice is to pick n0 = 4 for any security level,
although the computational savings are more significant when considering high-
security parameter choices (Category 3 and 5).
Table 3 reports the sizes of both the keypairs and the encapsulated secrets for
LEDAkem. In particular, regarding the size of the private keys we report both the
size of the stored private key and the required amount of main memory to store
the expanded key during the decryption phase. We note that, for a given security
category, increasing the value of n0 enlarges the public key, as it is constituted
of (n0− 1)p bits. This increase in the size of the public key represents a tradeoff
with the decrease of the size of the ciphertext to be transmitted since it is only
p bits long, and p decreases if a larger number of blocks is selected, for a fixed
security category. The size of the derived encapsulated secret is at least 256 bits,
in order to meet the requirement reported in [32]. The shared secret is derived
employing the SHA-3 hash function with a 256, 384 or 512 bits digest, in order
to match the requirements of Categories 1, 3, and 5, respectively.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced a post-quantum KEM based on QC-LDPC codes with the
following advantages: it is built on an NP-complete problem under reasonable
assumptions; it exploits improved BF decoders which are faster than classical
BF decoders; it requires compact keypairs (below 23 kiB at most), with min-
imum size private keys; it needs only addition and multiplication over F2[x],
and modular inverse over F2[x]/〈xp + 1〉 besides single-precision integer opera-
tions; it is particularly efficient in applying countermeasures against non-profiled
power consumption side channel attacks. As regards implementation, no plat-
form specific optimizations have been exploited, thus we expect these results to
be quite consistent across different platforms. On the other hand, starting from
this platform-agnostic reference implementation, a number of optimizations can
be applied to make LEDAkem faster.
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